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%XLOGLQJ/DERXU,QWHUQDWLRQDOLVPµIURPEHORZ¶ 
/HVVRQVIURPWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO'RFNZRUNHUV&RXQFLO¶V(XURSHDQ:RUNLQJ*URXS 
 
Abstract 
This paper considers whether the efficacy of transnational unionism, a strategy for trade 
union movement revitalisation, might be increased by a second revitalisation strategy ± 
rank-and-file trade union democracy. This question is examined through a study of the 
International Dockworkers Council, an exceptional case of institutionalised rank-and-file 
union democracy at the transnational level. A shadow comparison examines the work of 
the International Transport Workers Federation, a bureaucratic trade union organisation 
active in the same sector. 7KH,'&¶VVWUXFWXUHLVIRXQGWRLQFUHDVHWKHHIILFDF\RI
transnational unionism by removing layers of bureaucratic mediation that slow down 
action, fostering a culture of militant solidarity among participants. Nevertheless, 
participants noted the heavy personal burdens placed on activists under this model and 
some difficulties operating without the assistance of paid professionals. Additionally, 
differing national legal and political contexts for unionism remain significant barriers to 
effective internationalism.  
 
Keywords: dockworkers, Europe, internationalism, trade union bureaucracy, trade union 
democracy, 
 
Global Unionism, Union Democracy and Movement Revitalisation in Europe 
The declining power of trade unions in Europe has inspired a sizeable literature on 
strategies for revitalisation (Frege and Kelly, 2004; Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 2013). 
Within the trade union movement, consistent calls have been made to internationalise (Gallin 
2014) as the increasing Europeanisation of capital and regulation have made transnational 
collaboration a greater necessity than ever. However, Europeanisation has simultaneously 
undermined the conditions for the emergence of trade union internationalism by weakening 
national trade unions and forcing them into defensive battles for survival (Bieler and Schulten 
2008; Dribbusch 2015; Bieler and Erne 2014; Bieler 2013; Stan, et al. 2015; Nowak and Gallas 
2014). Furthermore, despite the growth of transnational regulation, persistent national 
differences in labour law may impede more militant and effective forms of cooperation 
(Pulignano et al. 2013: 141; Dufresne 2015: 147-8; Larsson 2014: 391-2).  Consequently, trade 
union activities within Europe remain heavily focused at the national level (Martin and Ross 
2000; Erne 2008).  
Transnational collaboration nevertheless remains a potent, though underutilised, tool in 
ODERXU¶VDUVHQDO7KLVSDSHUH[DPLQHVZKHWKHUWKHHIILFDF\RIWUDGHXQLRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVPPD\
be enhanced by a second revitalisation strategy: an organisational model of rank-and-file 
democracy. While many scholars (Dufresne 2015; Harvey and Turnbull 2015; Hyman 2013; 
Moody 1997; Waterman 2001; Wills 1998) argue that building transnational structures firmly 
connected to shop-floor unionism would result in more effective internationalism, few studies 
have tested out this proposition empirically and arguments tend to rely on anecdotal evidence. 
This article therefore contributes to the literature through analysis of original empirical research 
into the efficacy of the International Dockworkers Council, an organisation which provides a 
model of rank-and-file union democracy at the transnational level. A shadow comparison with 
the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), a professionalised, bureaucratic 
organisation, facilitates analysis of the broader implications of organisational form for 
transnational trade unionism.  
The next section of the paper provides an overview of long-standing debates on the 
efficacy of bureaucratic and rank-and-file forms of trade unionism, followed by a discussion of 
research design, case selection and methodology. Findings examine the advantages and 
GLVDGYDQWDJHVRIWKH,'&¶VRUJDQLVDWLRQDOPRGHODVZHOODVUHPDLQLQJFKDOOHQJHVIRU
transnationally-RUJDQLVHGZRUNHUVWRUHVROYH,QWHUYLHZUHVSRQGHQWVDUJXHWKDWWKH,'&¶VUDQN-
and-file structure does indeed facilitate more effective coordination of solidarity among 
European dockworkers than the bureaucratic structure of the ITF. Yet, the ,'&¶VPRGHODOVR
imposes significant personal costs on activists as well as occasional difficulties of operating 
without professional assistance. Additionally, problems of effective transnational coordination 
stemming from differing national contexts for trade unionism remain. In the conclusion, the 
applicability of these findings for transnational trade unionism more broadly are explored. 
 
Theorising the Effects of Trade Union Governance Models 
Bureaucratic and Rank-and-File Forms of Trade Unionism 
As used herein, bureaucratic trade unionism ± RUµSURIHVVLRQDOXQLRQLVP¶+HHU\DQG
Kelly 1994) refers to the direction and management of trade unions by full-time officials, 
whether elected or appointed, while democratic trade unionism ± RUµSDUWLFLSDWLYH XQLRQLVP¶
(Ibid) refers to the direction and management of trade unions by rank-and-file workers. While 
these are ideal types and elements of both are often present in the same organisation, key 
distinguishing factors include the degree of 1) participatory or representative democracy 2) local 
union autonomy and 3) control over organisational resources by full-time officials or rank-and-
file workers. In his classic study, Michels (1911) views the bureaucratisation of political parties 
and trade unions, regardless of their politics, as an inevitability ² DQµLURQODZRIROLJDUFK\¶± a 
view shared by Offe and Wiesenthal (1980) who argue that bureaucratisation is an inevitable 
effect of growth and institutionalisation. Writers in the Marxist tradition tend to agree, arguing 
that because full-time officials depend for their livelihoods on the stability of trade unions as 
institutions, they hold back the militancy of the rank-and-file and reach unfavourable 
compromises with management (see Darlington and Upchurch 2011 for a review).  
This doubly negative view of trade union bureaucratisation as both inevitable and always 
detrimental, however, is not universally shared. Another school of thought, evident in much of 
the classical industrial relations literature (Webb and Webb 1920; Kerr et al 1960) takes a 
positive view of bureaucratisation as a hallmark of trade union maturity and a necessity for 
efficacy. As Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin (1995: 834) put it:  
µ7KHXQGHUO\LQJSUHPLVHRIWKHWKHRU\WKDWPRQROLWKLFEXUHDXFratic unions are superior in 
winning material benefits for their members is that rationality and efficiency are 
enhanced by bureaucracy. . . Nondemocratic or oligarchical rule is required for the 
effective defense of union members' interests because to copHZLWK³EDUJDLQLQJ
SXJLOLVP´WKHXQLRQQHHGVDFHQWUDOL]HGDSSDUDWXVWKDWSDUDOOHOVWKHVWUXFWXUHRIPRGHUQ
LQGXVWU\DQGHQDEOHVLWWRFRXQWHUYDLOWKHFRQFHQWUDWLRQRIFRUSRUDWHSRZHU¶ 
 
This position is elaborated by Voss and Sherman (2000: 309, 337-338, 342-4), for example, who 
find that contemporary trade union movement revitalisation depends RQWKHµEXUHDXFUDWLFSRZHU¶
of the national union (342-343 to shake local branches out of their complacency. Voss (2010: 
377) concludes WKDWµSDLGXQLRQVWDIIVWrong leadership and central coordination have played a 
PRUHFRQVLVWHQWNH\UROHLQXQLRQUHQHZDO¶ than rank-and-file union democracy. 
 
While some scholars question whether rank-and-file democracy is ever truly sustainable 
in the long-term (see Darlington and Upchurch 2011: 78 for a review), others argue that though 
unions tend towards bureaucratisation, the development of strong rank-and-file structures from 
within can resist this tendency (Ibid: 90). This position is supported by a number of empirical 
studies of trade unionism in the United States (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1995; Stepan-Norris 
and Zeitlin 1996; Levi et al 2009). Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin (1996: 3, 27) take perhaps the 
strongest position on this question, arguing that whether trade unions develop in democratic or 
bureaucratic directions is simply the result of contingent internal political struggles. 
%XUHDXFUDWLVDWLRQWKHUHIRUHLVE\QRPHDQVLQHYLWDEOHDQGFDQEHVWDYHGRIIE\µLQVXUJHQF\DQG
UDGLFDOLVP¶ 
In addition, studies by Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin (1995), Levi et al (2009) and Levesque 
and Murray (2002) conclude that rank-and-file democracy is not only possible but increases the 
ability of trade unions to win major gains for their members. Levesque and Murray (2002) in fact 
conceptualize local-level participatory trade union democracy as a power resource and critical 
precondition for revitalisation. Levi et al (2009) demonstrate that heavy-handed intervention by 
national trade union bureaucracies ± ZKDWWKHDXWKRUVWHUPµ7KH9RVVDQG6KHUPDQVWUDWHJ\¶± is 
QRWWKHRQO\ZD\WREULQJDERXWµDUHQHZHGHPSKDVLVRQRUJDQLVLQJDQGPRUHPLOLWDQW
FRQIURQWDWLRQRIHPSOR\HUV¶,QVWHDGWKH,/:8ZKLFKUHSUHVHQWVGRFNZRUNHUVRQWKH
:HVW&RDVWRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVµSRVVHVVHVDVWURQJand long-standing rank-and-file democracy 
DQGDGHPRQVWUDWHGFDSDFLW\IRUZLQQLQJJRRGFRQWUDFWV¶, as well as a commitment to 
organising (223).  
Implications for Transnational Unionism  
Moving to the international scale, Stevis and Boswell (2007) and Pulignano (2007) 
highlight the far greater logistical difficulties trade unions face in carrying out effective 
campaigns of global scope and argue that a high degree of delegation by national unions to an 
international organising body and centralisation of command is therefore necessary. Hyman 
(2005) and Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2013) take a different view, however, arguing 
that some of the same problems emanating from bureaucratic forms of trade unionism at the 
national level are evident at the transnational level: a disconnect between full-time officials and 
rank-and-ILOHZRUNHUVZLWKRXWZKRVHµXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGFRPPLWPHQWWKHUHLVOLWWOHFDSDFLW\WR
DFWFROOHFWLYHO\¶+\PDQDQG*XPEUHll-McCormick 2013: 12-13.)  
Consequently, many scholars (Hyman 2013; Harvey and Turnbull 2015; Dufresne 2015) 
argue that building effective trade union internationalism in Europe requires breaking out of the 
µHOLWHHPEUDFH¶RI%UXVVHOVWRIRUPWUDQVQDWLRQDl organisations with a stronger base at the shop-
floor level. Nevertheless, Hyman (2005: 150) calls for a mix of top-down and bottom-up 
DSSURDFKHVWRJOREDOXQLRQLVPDUJXLQJWKDWµ,WLVQHFHVVDU\WREXLOGRQWKHUHVRXUFHVKLVWRULFDO
understanding and strDWHJLFFDSDFLW\RIµEXUHDXFUDWLF¶XQLRQRUJDQLVDWLRQZKLOHDOVRFXOWLYDWLQJ
WKHLQLWLDWLYHDQGÀH[LELOLW\RIJUDVVURRWVLQLWLDWLYH¶0RRG\:DWHUPDQDQG:LOOV
(1998), on the other hand, go further, arguing that trade union bureaucracy is neither necessary 
nor inevitable and calling for the development of international rank-and-file democracy.   
 
Research Design 
Case Selection 
Dockworkers provide an ideal case for the study of trade union internationalism because 
of the inherently internationally-oriented character of their work and the long history of 
internationalism in the sector. Their successful campaign to defeat a European Directive on port 
ZRUNLQWKHHDUO\¶VLVIUHTXHQWO\FLWHGDVRQHRIWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWH[DPSOHVRI
transnational European trade unionism (Turnbull 2006; Leiren and Parks 2014). Dockworkers 
are well-known for the strength of their trade unions and militancy (Turnbull 1992), grounded in 
their key position in the economy and the nature of the labour process (Bonacich and Wilson 
2008; Kerr and Siegel 1954) ² even if, in practice, their strength and militancy has varied across 
space and time (Turnbull and Sapsford 2001), particularly as they have encountered the rise of 
global neoliberalism (Turnbull and Wass, 1994). Dockworkers possess a high degree of 
µZRUNSODFHEDUJDLQLQJSRZHU¶DVDUHVXOWRIWKHLUDELOLW\WRSUHYHQWWKHGRFNLQJDQGXQORDGLQJRI 
megaships, and by extension, the global circulation of commodities (Author). This provides them 
with an exceptional degree of leverage during industrial disputes which may be wielded in 
solidarity with fellow dockworkers in other countries. Dock work within Europe may therefore 
EHXQGHUVWRRGDVDµEHVWFDVHVFHQDULR¶IRUWUDGHXQLRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVPDn internationally 
oriented sector in which workers possess a high degree of industrial power, within a region of the 
world in which trade unionism enjoys strong legal protections. 
Dockworkers are also unusual within the world of global trade unionism in that they have 
available to them two competing international trade union organisations ± the International 
Dockworkers Council (IDC) and the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) -- along 
with its European affiliate, the European Transport Workers Federation (ETF). The IDC and the 
ITF/ETF are characterized by marked differences in organisational form. The ITF/ETF 
exemplify the dominant model of mainstream global union organisations: a high degree of 
centralisation of command, with decisions taken by top officials of national affiliate unions aided 
by a bureaucratic structure staffed by professionals. The IDC, in contrast to the ITF/ETF, is 
organised along principles of horizontalism, voluntarism and rank-and-file democracy.  
The IDC was founded in 2000 following a multi-year labour dispute at the Port of 
/LYHUSRROLQWKH¶V6DXQGU\DQG7XUQEXOO. The Liverpool dockers had found 
themselves at odds with their national union, the T&GWU, which had initially refused to back 
them during the dispute and blocked support from their international organisation, the ITF. 
Dockworkers active in the Liverpool campaign had therefore seen the need for a more 
horizontally organised body that would redress the issues of bureaucratization that they believed 
lay at the heart of the failed Liverpool dispute (Author). Building on a long-standing tradition of 
ad-hoc rank-and-file internationalism in the sector, the IDC modelled itself organisationally on 
the independent Spanish dockworkers union La Coordinadora (Waterman 1998), which has 
continued to play a central role in the IDC.  
Organised along the principle of mutual aid, WKH,'&¶V European affiliates are drawn 
from a wide range of left political orientations, including social democrats, Christian democrats, 
Communists and independent, non-aligned leftists. The IDC is an entirely independent global 
union organisation; it is not affiliated to any other international trade union or political bodies. 
Nineteen years since its founding, the Barcelona-based IDC represents 100,000 dockworkers in 
30 countries and has become a major force in international dockworker activism 
(http://www.idcdockworkers.org/en/). While a handful of trade unions in Europe have dual 
affiliations to the IDC and the ITF/ETF, and the organisations have worked together productively 
at times, they are often locked into a fierce competition for affiliates (Turnbull 2010). What 
advantages ± if any ± then, GRHVWKH,'&¶VRUJDQLVDWLRQDOPRGHORIUDQN-and-file democracy 
provide in the effective coordination of international trade union activities as compared with the 
ITF/ETF model of bureaucratic internationalism?  
TABLE 1 HERE. 
Methodology 
An exceptional case ± the International Dockworkers Council ± is selected as the primary 
focus of the research on the basis of its unusual organisational form within the field of global 
trade unionism. Exceptional case selection is often used for exploratory research to consider 
explanations that have not been adequately considered in the past (Seawright and Gerring 2008) 
± in this case, the impact of organisational form on the efficacy of international trade unionism. 
The shadow comparison methodology ± frequently used in comparative research in political 
science ± is used to elucidate various aspects of the exceptional case through comparison to a 
typical case of international trade union organisational form, that of the ITF/ETF (Gerring 2006). 
The ITF/ETF is a far larger organisation than the IDC, representing workers across the 
transportation sector, so a true apples-to-apples comparison is not possible at this level. Instead, 
rather than a fully fleshed out comparison, the shadow comparison focuses only on areas of 
RYHUODSWKDWLVWKH,7)(7)¶VZRUNZLWKGRFNHUVLQ:HVWHUQDQG0HGLWHUUDQHDQ(XURSH7KH
,7)(7)¶VZRUNLQRWKHUVHFWRUVDQGUHJLRQVRI(XURSHZKHUHWKH,'&LVQRWDFWLYHKDYH
therefore not been included in the study.   
Research for this article was conducted between 2012 and 2016 in Spain, England, 
Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy, Greece, Portugal, the 
United Kingdom and Cyprus. Forty-six semi-structured interviews with IDC and ETF activists 
and staff, along with participant observation at a dozen international meetings, form the core of 
the analysis. Participant observation, conducted with the permission of the IDC, enabled the 
researcher to build rapport with research participants and form working hypotheses which were 
then explored through interviews. Interview participants were selected through purposive 
sampling on the basis of their participation in international dockworker activism in Europe. 
Additional research participants who met the study criteria of participation in the IDC and/or 
ITF/ETF were selected through snowball sampling.  
Research into the efficacy of global trade unionism has tended to focus on the outcomes 
of specific campaigns. The innovative feature of the research for this article, by contrast, is its 
IRFXVRQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIthe efficacy of divergent organisational forms in general, 
providing novel insights into an understudied, though critical, dimension of trade union 
internationalism. Semi-structured interviews of 1-2 hours in length were generally conducted at 
DFWLYLVWV¶KRPHSRUWV:LWKWKHH[FHSWLRQof the Maltese union, IDC working group members 
from every European affiliate union at the time of research were interviewed. Interviews were 
conducted with core ITF/ETF activists from Germany, England, the Netherlands and Belgium, as 
well as with staff in Brussels and London. Table 2 provides details on the number of interviews 
conducted in each country and the international affiliations of the trade unions. Interviews were 
recorded and transcribed and themes were identified and coded manually by the researcher. The 
researcher utilised an iterative framework for data analysis in which interviews were first coded 
individually upon completion and then re-coded in stages as further interviews were conducted, 
allowing for a reconsideration of earlier codes and themes in light of later interview data.  
TABLE 2 HERE 
Appraisal of the IDC¶VOrganisational Model 
 
In contrast to the ITF/ETF, IDC participants are all dockworkers themselves, the majority 
of whom serve on local branch committees of their trade unions, rather than as top national 
officials, and are not compensated for their international work. Local unions, and even individual 
dockworkers, may affiliate directly to the IDC, a significant benefit for activists who find 
themselves at odds with their national organisations, as in the Liverpool dispute described above. 
There are no executive officers and only a single staff member. Instead, decisions are taken by 
consensus of the participants and must be ratified in assemblies of rank-and-file members at the 
ports before action is taken. Annual general assemblies open to all members set the overall 
direction of the organisation. The analysis in this research article IRFXVHVSULPDULO\RQWKH,'&¶V
European working group, formed in 2012 as a body that would meet more frequently than the 
annual assemblies, with participation from each affiliate, in order to respond rapidly to issues 
facing European dockworkers as a result of the economic crisis and austerity politics.  
 
 Advantages of the IDC Model: Agility, Militancy, Culture and Community 
 
Working-group participants identified what they viewed as a number of key advantages 
RIWKH,'&¶VRUJDQLVDWLRQDOPRGHO± agility, militancy, culture and community ± and argued that 
they GHULYHGIURPDFWLYLVWV¶HPEHGGHGQHVVLQORFDOSRUWZRUNSODFHVDQGWUDGe unions. As a 
Spanish IDC participant from Algeciras put it: 
µ$SHUVRQWKDWZDQWVWRGHIHQGWKHGRFNZRUNHUVDQGWKDWGRHVQ¶WJRWRZRUNDWWKHSRUW
FDQ¶WGHIHQGWKHGRFNZRUNHUVEHFDXVHWKH\GRQ¶WNQRZZKDWKDSSHQV7KH\FDQNQRZD
lot about laws, they can know a lot about negotiation, they can be the best guy in the 
ZRUOGEXWLIWKH\DUHQ¶WLQWKHSRUWDQGFDQ¶WJRDQGVHHDQGVPHOOWKHRGRURIWKHVHDDQG
experience heat and experience cold and work at night and get wet when it rains, they 
FDQ¶WWUDQVPLW RUFDQ¶WIHHOZKDWLWLVWKDWWKHcompañeros GHPDQG¶ 
 
$*UHHN,'&SDUWLFLSDQWFRQFXUUHGDUJXLQJWKDWWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VVWUHQJWKGHULYHVIURPµthe 
IDFWWKDWZHGRQ¶WKLUHSHUVRQVEXWZHJLYHRXUSHUVRQDOWLPHLWPHDQVWKDW\RXEHOLHYHLQWKLV
$QG\RXORYHVRPHKRZWKLVWKLQJ<RXFDUHDERXW\RXUFROOHDJXHVLQRWKHUSRUWV¶ The ITF, 
in contrast, according to a Danish IDC participant, is: 
µDUHYHUVHIXQQHO,I\RXZDQWWRFUHDWHVROLGDULW\LW¶VWKHUDQN-and-ILOHLW¶VWKHGRFNHU
WKDWQHHGVWRGRLW:H¶UHQRWPDFKLQHV:H¶YHJRWRXURZQPLQGV:HFDQWKLQN$QG
WKDW¶VZK\,7)KDVEHHQUHDOO\EDGLW¶VDWRS-down organisatLRQ¶ 
 
The non-hierarchical, direct and collective approach of the working-group, coupled with the lack 
of a decision-making role for staff, were cited by participants as key differences between the 
organisations.  
Working group activists noted the importance of their person-to-person ties, not mediated 
or constrained by a bureaucracy, in delivering powerful solidarity actions in a timely manner. An 
English IDC participant contrasted his experience with the IDC to his experience with the ITF:  
µLW¶VWRWDOO\UXQE\WKHEXUHDXFUDF\,VSRNHWRDGRFNHUIURP>DQ,7)SRUW@,VDLGµlook, 
OHW¶VJHW\RXUSKRQHQXPEHULW¶GEHJRRGWRKDYHDELWRIDFRQWDFW¶. And he said, µno, no, 
QR\RXFDQ¶WKDYHP\SKRQHQXPEHU¶. µWhy not?¶ He went, µWKDW¶VQRWWKHZD\ZH¶YHJRW
to do it. . . you need to go through your official to go to your national officer to go to the 
ITF who will then contact the national officer. . . who will contact my local officer who will 
speak to me¶. So I said, µbut I might just want to chat. I might just want some information, 
ZKDWWLPH¶VDVKLSOHDYLQJ\RXUSRUW¶. But he said, µyou know how it should go¶. So at that 
point, ,WKRXJKWWKLVLVDFRPSOHWHDQGXWWHUZDVWHRIWLPH¶ 
 
Instead, as a )UHQFK,'&SDUWLFLSDQWDUJXHGµZLWK,'&LW¶VUHDOO\VLPSOH,KDYHP\SKRQH,
have the numbers, I can . . . simply call him if I need information or I need to bring some 
VROLGDULW\¶ A Spanish IDC activist concurred: 
µ)RUXVEXUHDXFUDF\LVDVORZLQg down of all conflict. If we have a conflict tomorrow in 
Costa Rica, the next day we have people already prepared to look for alternatives, to 
carry out solidarity actions. . . With a higher degree of bureaucratisation, if tomorrow we 
have a conflict in CRVWD5LFDWKHFRQIOLFWZRQ¶WDUULYHDWWKHFHQWUDORIILFHXQWLO0RQGD\
DQGDGHFLVLRQZRQ¶WEHPDGHXQWLO)ULGD\XQWLOWKHQH[WZHHN$QGZHXQGHUVWDQG
that we dockworkers enduring a conflict cannot wait three weeks . . .  We have to make 
decisions at the base-OHYHODQGPDNHWKHPZLWKIRUFHDQGGLUHFWO\¶ 
 
A key ITF/(7)SDUWLFLSDQWIURP%HOJLXPZKLOHHPSKDVL]LQJWKH(7)¶VJUHDWHUDELOLW\WR
QDYLJDWHLQVWLWXWLRQVRI(XURSHDQJRYHUQDQFHLQIDFWVKDUHGDVLPLODUSHUVSHFWLYHµIDC is much 
stronger thDQ(7)LQJRLQJGLUHFWO\WRHDFKRWKHU,7)(7)LVVORZHU,W¶VELJJHU,WZRUNV
much easier. . . as an ,'&PHPEHUEHFDXVHWKH\LQIRUPHDFKRWKHU¶  
Several IDC participants gave the example of a hastily-organized meeting in 2013 by the 
British union UNITE in support of the unionization campaign at the newly opened London 
Gateway Port. Though UNITE as a national union is an affiliate of the ETF, none of the national-
level ETF reps from Europe attended the meeting, citing the short timeframe in which it was 
organized. Local-level port leaders in England affiliated to the IDC insisted that IDC reps be 
invited, and nearly twenty showed up with just a few days¶ notice, in addition to a local-level 
ITF/ETF activist from Antwerp with close ties to the IDC. IDC activists at the Port of Algeciras 
in Spain quickly took action against the first ship to arrive from London Gateway, providing a 
major push to the employer to resolve the dispute (Author).  
An English ITF/ETF activist reflected on the RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶YHUy different responses to 
the hastily organised meeting: 
µWKH\¶YH>,7)/ETF] been a bit critical . . .  for the short notice we gave in calling the 
meeting. . . But . . . the ship was coming in and we had to deal with it . . .  on the spot. . .  
,I\RX¶UHDQRIILFLDO\RX¶UHREYLRXVO\YHU\EXV\$QGVR\RXUGLDU\LVSODQQHGZHHNVDQG
PRQWKVLQDGYDQFH6RLI\RXJLYHVRPHERG\DZHHN¶VQRWLFHLW¶VGLIILFXOW:KHUHDVD
rank-and-ILOHPHPEHULW¶VDORWHDVLHUIRUWKHPWRJHWWRDPHHWLQJFDOOHGDWVKRUWQRWLFH¶ 
 
The only ITF/ETF activist to attend, a Belgian dockworker from Antwerp, expressed surprise 
WKDWWKH'XWFKXQLRQ)19ZKLFKUHSUHVHQWVGRFNZRUNHUVDW(XURSH¶VODUJHst port in Rotterdam, 
had not been there:  
µ7KH\ZHUHYHU\EXV\%XWIRUPHZKDWWKH\FDQGRLVOLNHZKDW>RXUXQLRQ
leadership] does with me. Somebody should be sent, another activist. At least to follow 
up the idea. But this is difficult for such a union. . . Those leaders, they want to keep 
HYHU\WKLQJIRUWKHPVHOYHV$OHDGHUFDQQRWEHHYHU\ZKHUH¶ 
 
The ITF/ETF-affiliated Rotterdam dockworkers subsequently slowed down the first ship to 
arrive from Gateway for one hour by utilizing the ,7)¶V global agreement on maritime labor to 
LQVSHFWWKHVHDIDUHUV¶ZRUNLQJFRQGLWLRQV. Yet, most shipping lines are well-equipped to work 
around short stoppages. Instead, an ITF/ETF activist from England argued that the 24-hour 
blockade by IDC dockworkers in AlgecLUDVZRXOGKDYHµKDGDPDVVLYHLPSDFWRQWKHVKLSSLQJ
line. I imagine they put a hell of a lot of pressure on DPWorld to get something agreed.¶ 
:RUNLQJJURXSSDUWLFLSDQWVDWWULEXWHGWKH,'&¶VPLOLWDQF\WRLWVRUJDQLVDWLRQDOIRUP$
6SDQLVK,'&DFWLYLVWIURP$OJHFLUDVHPSKDVLVHGWKDWµ7KHUDQN-and-file worker sees me in the 
port and can perfectly well ask me whatever appeals to them, tell me how they see it, and 
PRUHRYHU,¶PDEOHWRIHHOLIZKDWZHDUHGRLQJLVJRRGLIZKDWZHDUHGRLQJQHHGVPRUH
UHIOHFWLRQ¶In additional to enabling them to make accurate assessments of where the rank-
and-file stand on different issues, IDC activists argued that their embeddedness in local worksites 
allowed them to more easily engage in education and organising on international issues. A 
Spanish IDC activist from Barcelona reported:  
µ%HIRUHPDNLQJGHFLVLRQVZHKDYHDOOKDGWKHREOLJDWLRQWREULQJWKHP to our ports . . 
. and debate them with our workers to arrive at a position. There is not a decision taken 
E\WKH,'&WKDWFRPHVIURPWKHZRUNLQJJURXSVD\LQJµWKLVLVLWWRPRUURZWKHUHKDVWREH
DVWULNH¶7KHZRUNHUVVHHWKHGHFLVLRQVDVRXURZQ . At the end, the decisions 
EHFRPHWKHLURZQDQGWKH\EHOLHYHLQWKHP¶ 
 
Consequently, activists argued that because actions were both decided upon and implemented by 
the rank-and-file at the local port level, the IDC was better positioned than the ITF/ETF to take 
aggressive positions on international issues. 
 
Working Group members argued that WKH,'&¶VZRUNHU-centred culture and community 
facilitated trust, friendship and feelings of brotherhood, which they viewed as key factors in the 
organisation¶V success. An English IDC participant appreciated: 
µWKHODXJKLQJWKHMRNLQJWKHPLFNH\-taking²LW¶VLGHQWLFDO\RXNQRZDEVROXWHO\
LGHQWLFDOWKHUH¶VWKDWFRPUDGHU\WKDW¶VZKDWLW¶VEXLOWRQLVQ¶WLW"LQWKHOLPLWHG
,7)VWXII,¶YHEHHQLQYROYHG with, you know, I meet colleagues, associates. In the IDC, I 
kind of meet my friends. I regard them as good friends now because I know they think 
like me, they act like me, muck about the same as me. And I feel really comfortable in 
meetings with them. I NQRZ,FDQVSHDNIUHHO\DQGRSHQO\DQGGLVFXVVDQ\WKLQJ,OLNH¶ 
 
This sense of closeness was fostered through frequent in-person meetings that moved among 
GLIIHUHQWSRUWORFDWLRQVSURYLGLQJSDUWLFLSDQWVZLWKWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRYLVLWRQHDQRWKHU¶VZRUN
places and union offices and meet rank-and-file dockers across Europe. These person-to-person 
ties were often maintained through social media. Meetings also involved a significant social 
component. As a result,  
µ%HFDXVHZHVHHHDFKRWKHUSHULRGLFDOO\ZHDOUHDG\NQRZZKRZHDUHZHKDYHGLUHFW
contacts, and at the end, we KDYHDUHODWLRQVKLSWKDW¶VDSDUWIURPWKHXQLRQDKXPDQ
UHODWLRQVKLS:HDOUHDG\NQRZZKRFDQDQGZKRFDQ¶WZKRKDVDQGZKRGRHVQ¶WKDYH
DQGWKDWZD\ZHFDQDGYDQFHDORW¶Interview, Spanish IDC participant, Algeciras) 
 
Interview participants emphasised the significance of major pan-European dockworker 
mobilizations against the European Directive in 2006 in Strasbourg and in support of Portuguese 
dockworkers in 2012 in Lisbon in forming a common identity and sense of purpose. A Swedish 
IDC participaQWIURP*RWKHQEXUJUHSRUWHGRIKLVPHPEHUV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQ6WUDVERXUJ 
µWKH\¶UHWRXJKJX\VLQWKHLURZQRSLQLRQ%XWZH¶UHQRWXVHGWRWKH6RXWKHUQ(XURSHDQ
approach to protests. The Spanish or the French, they brought gas masks, and then the 
teargas comes. So our guys were quite shocked and they were very proud, and still are, 
OLNHWKH\¶UHYHWHUDQVIURP6WUDVERXUJ¶ 
 
A Danish IDC participant from Aarhus shared his impressions of the Portuguese demonstration: 
µLWZDVDPD]LQJWRZDONWKURXJKWKHEHDXWLIul streets of Lisbon with so many dockers from all 
over Europe. . . it created a lot of network and [we] met a lot of people and started talking, got 
LQYROYHG¶ 
7KLVVWURQJVHQVHRIFRPPXQLW\ZDVDOVRHYLGHQWLQVORJDQVDQGYLVXDOFXOWXUHµ1HYHU
Walk AlonH$JDLQ¶± DVORJDQDGRSWHGIURPWKH/LYHUSRROGLVSXWHLQWKH¶V± has been 
IROORZHGXSPRUHUHFHQWO\E\µ3URXGWR%HD'RFNHU¶DQGµ'RQ¶W)XFN0\-RE¶7KHVHPHVVDJHV
were visible on mass-produced t-shirts, posters, banners, stickers and social media. (At least one 
long-WLPHDFWLYLVWKDGDQ,'&WDWWRR/RJRVVXSHULPSRVHGDGRFNHUV¶KRRNRUILVWRYHUDPDSRI
the world. The IDC has an official Facebook page, primarily for sharing press releases and 
photos of actions from around the world, but key activists participated frequently in larger rank-
and-file online fora as well. These included International Docker Force, Dockers Society and 
Dockers Hangaround, which collectively have several thousand followers globally and post a 
wide range of material, from serious news items on issues affecting dockers around the world to 
photos from work to humorous memes. Affiliate unions also maintained their own pages, as did 
key activists, who used the site frequently for information sharing, support and encouragement, 
and occasional debate.  
IDC participants volunteered time and again in interviews how personally significant 
relationships formed with counterparts in other countries had been for them, and the role this had 
SOD\HGLQEXLOGLQJWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VVWUHQJWKITF/ETF participants, by contrast, did not mention 
non-professional relationships in interviews. IDC participants contrasted the strong sense of 
community within the IDC to the ITF/ETF, highlighting the issue of trust. A Swedish IDC 
participant from Gothenburg explained: 
µ,I,FDlled a Spanish guy and said, µcan you do something for us?¶, and he called me and 
said, µwe can just slow down the ship¶DQG\RXVHHRQWKHFRPSXWHUWKDWLW¶VQRWHYHQ
there, that would be devastating. But for [the (7)@WKDWLVQRUPDO,W¶VMXVWVRPHWKLQg that 
you include in a press release, and everything is fine. The employers of course know this, 
VRLWKDVQRHIIHFWDQ\PRUH¶ 
 
Problems of trust within the ITF/ETF were evident from interviews with a number of ITF/ETF 
participants as well. A German ITF/ETF participant shared a perception voiced by both IDC and 
ITF/ETF participants with regard to the ITF/ETF affiliated Dutch union which represents 
ZRUNHUVDW(XURSH¶VODUJHVWSRUWLQ5RWWHUGDPµWKH\DUHZHDN7KH\EDUNOLNHGRJVEXWWKH\
cannot make indusWULDODFWLRQ¶$%HOJLDQITF/ETF participant shared the difficulties he had 
H[SHULHQFHGJHWWLQJKLVPHPEHUVWRVXSSRUWWKH'XWFKµP\PHPEHUVVD\WKRVH'XWFKJX\VLQ
Ports Packages I and II, we did five strikes of 24 hours. They did a small part. We sent more than 
fifty coaches to SWUDVERXUJ$QGWKH\VHQWWZRFRDFKHV¶2WKHUSDUWLFLSDQWVIURPERWKWKH
ITF/ETF and IDC faulted the Dutch union for its willingness to accept solidarity from others 
without reciprocating in meaningful ways. Nevertheless, a Swedish IDC participant noted that 
whereas in a bureaucratic organisation, it is the bureaucracy itself that holds the participants 
WRJHWKHUµThe thing is that trust is very important [in the IDC] . . . when something is going 
wrong because you lose trust in somebody, the hole is very deHS¶ 
Disadvantages of the IDC Model: Personal Costs and Lack of Professional Expertise 
IDC participants emphasised the high personal costs of participation and occasional 
difficulties of operating with a very low budget and no professional staff as key disadvantages of 
the IDC model. With the exception of a small number of single male participants and one mother 
with primary childcare responsibilities, nearly all of the working group participants were men 
who either had older children with fewer childcare needs and/or partners who took primary 
responsibility for care work in the home. Frequent travel to international meetings, in addition to 
their regular work on the docks and union responsibilities at home ports, placed significant 
burdens on family relationships:  
µODVWZHHNP\ZLIHVDLGWRPHµwhy do me and the kids always come second?¶ $QGVKH¶V
right. Because I find it extremely easy to say, µbut I can take the kids out tomorrow. . 
7KLVPHHWLQJ¶VRQWKLVGD\DWWKLVWLPH,FDQ¶WSXWLWRII¶$QG,¶YHVSHQWZD\ZD\WRR
many years saying to my wife and kids, µ,¶OOGRWKDWZLWK\RXWRPRUURZ¶ 
(Interview, IDC participant, Northern Europe)  
 
An IDC participant from Southern Europe concurred:  
µLWWDNHVDORWRIWLPHDZD\IURPWKHIDPLO\LW¶VQHFHVVDU\WRGHGLFDWHPDQ\KRXUVWR
WKLVLW¶VQHFHVVDU\WRWUDYHOZKHQ,¶PDWKRPH,¶PUHDGLQJQHZVDERXWWKHVHFWRU
. all I do is talk on the phone with people that call me from the sector, with my 
comrades.¶ 
 
Similar experiences were echoed in interviews with participants from a wide range of countries. 
Due to the high cost of hiring translators, active participation tended to be somewhat 
limited to those conversant in English. Yet, an IDC participant from Greece noted that this is less 
of an issue than it might have been in the past since  
µWKHSHRSOHWKDWZRUNLQWKHSRUWVQRZNQRZPDQ\PRUHWKLQJVWKDQRXUFROOHDJXHV
twenty or thirty years back. . . they are more qualified, they know languages, they can use 
new technology, they can go through legal papers and create politics and develop 
VWUDWHJLHV¶ 
 
Additionally, widely available internet access helped to ameliorate these problems. Email and 
Whatsapp, for example, cut down on the cost of communication and the availability of free 
translation sites online made this a particularly valuable way to communicate.  
On the other hand, some participants noted that they would like to see both a greater 
financial investment in the organisation to support the costs of participation, as well as greater 
flexibility in hiring specialists to take on particular tasks. As an IDC participant from Greece put 
LWµ:HDUHQRWH[DFWO\DPDWHXUVEXWVRPHWLPHVZHQHHGPRUHSURIHVVLRQDOKHOS¶$Q,'&
participant from Spain centrally involved in the health and safety committee agreed: 
µ,QWKHHQGZHDUHGRFNZRUNHUVZKRVHSURIHVVLRQLVWRORDGDQGXQORDGVKLSVDQGZH
play . . .  at being experts in health and safety, in training, when there are people who 
really are experts in these subjects. . . I think that the structure of the ITF and ETF in this 
aspect is much more powerful. They directly have very qualified specialists thinking 
about these issues. . . The companies have people that work, that they pay to think eight 
hours a day how to fuck us. 6RWKH\¶UHDOZD\VDVWHSDKHDGZHGHGLFDWHDORWRIWLPH
DQGHIIRUWWRLWEXWZH¶UHQHYHUJRLQJWRUHDFKWKHVDPHOHYHODVWKHPMXVWE\ZLOOSRZHU
DQGHIIRUW¶ 
 
,QDVLPLODUYHLQDQ,'&SDUWLFLSDQWIURP/LVERQQRWHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIPHGLDVWUDWHJ\µLQWKH
last weeks, if we wanted this [victory] in Portugal, we needed to have here a press journalist 
talking with everybody. So we need to . . . invest more in the VWUXFWXUH>RIWKH,'&@¶7KH,'&¶V
DIY approach was also evident in their efforts to build the organisation further on volunteer 
HIIRUWVDORQHµZKDWZHFDQGRLVDFWXDOO\VHHLIVRPHRQHKDVDYDFDWLRQFORVHE\DVNWKHPWRJR
there, and say, here are a feZHPDLODGGUHVVHVLI\RXQHHGKHOSSOHDVHZULWHDQGWKH\GR¶
(Interview, Swedish IDC participant). A Spanish participant from Algeciras argued that, in 
FRQVHTXHQFHRIWKHODFNRIIXQGVDQGVWDIIWKH,'&IXQFWLRQDVµILUHILJKWHUVZKHQWKHUH¶VD
firHZHJRDQGSXWLWRXW¶,QWKLVUHVSHFWKHDUJXHGWKDWWKH,'&KDGIDUJUHDWHUDJLOLW\WKDQWKH
ITF/ETF, but a more difficult time implementing long-term projects.  
Additionally, though IDC participants shared criticisms of the ITF/(7)¶VPRGHO
ITF/ETF participants and staff argued that the more professionalised ETF had a much greater 
ability to successfully navigate the institutions of European governance, which they emphasised 
had proven crucial on several campaigns. An ETF official based in Brussels put it quite simply: 
WKH,'&µKDYHQRWXQGHUVWRRG\HWKRZ(XURSHIXQFWLRQV¶A German ITF/ETF participant, 
extolling the virtues of social partnership, argued that the IDC instead engages in µclass 
struggle¶µIf you do the struggle in this way . . . You lose, because . . . the shipowners and the 
finance industry and also some states. . . have a high potential for lobbying and working 
WRJHWKHU¶,'&SDUWLFLSDQWVFRQYHUVHO\VKDUHGDGLYHUVLW\RIYLHZVRQWKHµ(8TXHVWLRQ¶UDQJLQJ
from the view that the ETF did in fact have superior capacities, to the view that the IDC had 
greatly improved its capacity over time in Brussels, to the view that the importance of EU 
lobbying at the end of the day paled in comparison to the importance of grassroots mobilization 
and industrial action. 
Remaining Challenges for Labour Internationalism in Europe:  
National Legal and Political Differences  
 
 7KH,'&¶VRUJDQLVDWLRQDOPRGHOSURYLGHGDQXPEHURIGLVWLQFWDGYDQWDJHVRYHUWKH
ITF/ETF model but could not in itself overcome difficulties emerging from the differing national 
legal and political contexts of affiliate unions. The most significant obstacles to effective 
internationalism were restrictions on industrial action at the national level. Swedish and Danish 
dockworkers from the IDC emphasised the difficulties they faced in effectively communicating 
their legal constraints ² and the subsequent need for more flexible transnational tactics ² to 
southern European comrades who faced a more legally permissive environment for industrial 
action. A Danish participant argued:  
µRQHRIWKHZHDNQHVVHVLQWKHZRUNLQJJURXSKDVEHHQWKDWVRPHKDYHVDLGµwe all 
need to do the same thing¶. . . µOHW¶VMXVWVD\WKDWZHDJUHHRQVXSSRUWLQJPortugal. And 
what can you give?¶ . . . µWe can only do slowdowns.¶ µFine! So just slow down.¶ 
µDenmark?¶ µWe boycott the ship¶. . . We do what we can do. Why is it so important that 
ZHDOOGRWKHVDPH"¶ 
 
While participants argued that communication and understanding of these differences had 
improved over time, they continued to pose challenges at a practical level.  
 
 In addition, differing socio-political contexts in affiliate union countries impeded 
successful cross-border collaborations in some cases. For example, though the left-wing CGIL 
dockers from the northern Port of Genoa were long-time affiliates of the IDC, they had virtually 
QRSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQDVDUHVXOWRISRUWUHIRUPVFDUULHGRXWLQ,WDO\LQWKH¶V
which made many of the key issues facing European dockworkers redundant for them 
(interviews). Political contexts also played a significant role in blocking successful 
internationalism in cases where potential affiliates were unable to translate foreign political 
contexts to their members effectively. For example, a long-standing dispute at the Port of Piraeus 
in Greece against port privatization failed to receive the same kind of robust international 
solidarity in the form of ship blockades in Spain that IDC dockworkers in England and Portugal 
UHFHLYHGLQUHFHQW\HDUVDVDUHVXOWRIWKHGLIILFXOW\RIµVHOOLQJ¶WKH*UHHNDQWL-privatization issue 
within the Spanish context (Author).  
 
Conclusion 
Many scholars of global unionism (Bieler and Schulten 2008; Hyman 2013; Harvey and 
Turnbull 2015; Moody 1997; Waterman 2001; and Wills 1998) have argued that forms of labour 
internationalism putting the rank-and-file at the centre may substantially reduce problems of 
efficacy created by more bureaucratic forms of labour internationalism. While there has been 
VXEVWDQWLDOUHVHDUFKLQWRµRQH-RII¶ global solidarity campaigns organised in a non-bureaucratic 
fashion (for example, Cole 2018), this research article contributes to the literature by 
systematically examining the efficacy of an institutionalised form of rank-and-file 
internationalism through original empirical research into a novel global union organisation.  
The findings suggest that contrary to the arguments of Stevis and Boswell (2007) and 
Pulignano (2007) on the need for centralisation of command in international trade union bodies, 
an international organisational model of rank-and-file democracy instead provides significant 
advantages, facilitating greater agility, militancy, a shared culture and sense of community. 
Nevertheless, participants noted the heavy burden placed on individual activists and their 
families and the difficulties arising from a lack of professional staff. In consequence, as one 
DFWLYLVWSXWLWWKH,'&LVPRVWHIIHFWLYHDVµILUHILJKWHUV¶GXULQJGLVSXWHVDQGIDFHVJUHDWHU
difficulty in carrying out long-term projects. Furthermore, despite positive organisational 
innovations, differing national political and legal contexts of the affiliate unions continue to pose 
major challenges for effective coordination in Europe, as Pulignano et al. (2013), Dribbusch 
(2015) and Dufresne (2015) argue.  
European dockworkers face particularly propitious industrial and political conditions for 
international trade union organising that raise questions of transferability of the findings. Trade 
unionists in less internationally-oriented sectors of the economy; in sectors with less industrial 
power; and in parts of the world in which trade unionism is poorly institutionalised no doubt face 
far greater challenges which innovative organisational form alone will certainly not resolve. In 
fact, research suggests that in countries like Colombia in which trade unionists struggle for basic 
recognition, the superior resources and bureaucratic capacities of the ITF may provide significant 
advantages as compared with the IDC (Author). Nevertheless, the finding that a poorly resourced 
but well-networked organisation (the IDC) was able to provide significant advantages to 
European trade union affiliates as compared with a far better resourced but more bureaucratically 
organised body (the ITF/ETF) suggests that, at the very least, the role of organisational form in 
international trade unionism merits further research. Though it may not be possible to implement 
such a model for every group of workers in every part of the world, trade union activists 
LQWHUHVWHGLQEXLOGLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVPµIURPEHORZ¶ZRXOGGRZHOOWRQRWHWKDWthe ,'&¶VVXFFHVV
depends on a flexible, responsive and participatory democratic structure that puts shop-floor 
trade unionists into direct contact with one another, fostering a culture of militant solidarity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Works Cited 
 
Bieler A (2013) The EU, Global Europe and Processes of Uneven and Combined Development: 
The Problem of Transnational Labour Solidarity. Review of International Studies, 39(1): 161-
183. 
Bieler A, Schulten T (2008) European Integration: A Strategic Level for Trade Union Resistance 
to Neoliberal Restructuring and for the Promotion of Political Alternatives? In: Bieler A, 
Lindberg I and Pillay D (eds) Labour and the Challenges of Globalization: What Prospects for 
Transnational Solidarity? Ann Arbor, Michigan: Pluto Press, 231-247. 
Bieler A, Erne R (2014) Transnational Solidarity? The European Working Class in the Eurozone 
Crisis. In: Panitch L and Albo G (eds) Transforming Classes. Socialist Register 2015. London: 
Merlin Press, 157-77. 
Bonacich E, Wilson JB (2008) Getting the Goods: Ports, Labour and the Logistics Revolution. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
Cole, P (2018) Dockworker Power: Race and Activism in Durban and the San Francisco Bay 
Area. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
Darlington R, Upchurch M (2011) A Reappraisal of the Rank-and-File versus Bureaucracy 
Debate. Capital and Class 36(1): 77-95. 
Dribbusch H (2015) Where Is the European General Strike? Understanding the Challenges of 
Trans-European Trade Union Action against Austerity. Transfer, 21(2), European Collective 
Action in Times of Crisis: 171±185. 
Dufresne A (2015) The Trade Union Response to the European Economic Governance Regime. 
Transnational Mobilization and Wage Coordination. Transfer, 21(2), European Collective Action 
in Times of Crisis: 141±156. 
Erne, R (2008) (XURSHDQ8QLRQV/DERXU¶V4XHVWIRUD7UDQVQDWLRQDO'HPRFUDF\. Ithaca, New 
York: ILR Press. 
-- (2015) A Supranational Regime that Nationalizes Social Conflict: Explaining European Trade 
Unions' Difficulties in Politicizing European Economic Governance. Labour History, 56(3): 345-
368. 
Frege C, Kelly J (2004) Union Strategies in Comparative Context. In: Frege C, Kelly J (eds) 
Varieties of Unionism: Strategies for Union Revitalisation in a Globalizing Economy. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Gallin G (2014) Solidarity: Selected Essays. LabourStart. 
Gerring, John. 2012. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Harvey G, Turnbull P (2015) &DQ/DERXU$UUHVWWKHµ6N\3LUDWHV¶"7UDQVQDWLRQDO7UDGH
Unionism in the European Civil Aviation Industry. Labour History, 56(3): 308-326. 
Heery E, Kelly, J (1994). Professional, Participative and Managerial Unionism: An Interpretation 
of Change in Trade Unions. Work, Employment and Society 8(1): 1-22. 
Hyman R (2005) Shifting Dynamics in International Trade Unionism: Agitation, Organisation, 
Bureaucracy, Diplomacy. Labour History 46(2): 137-154. 
--(2013) European Trade Unions and the Long March through the Institutions: From Integration 
to Contention? In: Fairbrother P, Lévesque C and Hennebert M-A (eds) Transnational Trade 
Unionism: Building Union Power. New York: Routledge, 161-182. 
Hyman R, Gumbrell-McCormick R (2013) Trade Unions in Western Europe: Hard Times, Hard 
Choices. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
International Dockworkers Council. http://www.idcdockworkers.org/en/ 
Kerr C, Dunlop JT, Harbison R, Myers CA (1960) Industrialism and Industrial Man. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Kerr C, Abraham S (1954). The Interindustry Propensity to Strike ² An International 
Comparison. In: Kornhauser A, Dubin R and Ross AM (eds.), ,QGXVWULDO&RQÀLFW. New York: 
McGraw-Hill, pp. 189±212. 
Larsson, B (2014) Transnational Trade Union Action in Europe. European Societies 16(3): 378-
400.  
Leiren M D, Parks L (2014) When Trade Unions Succeed: Cases of Blocked Liberalisation in the 
Common Market. European Journal of Political Research 53: 465±479. 
Levesque C, Murray G (2002) Local versus Global: Activating Local Union Power in the Global 
Economy. Labour Studies Journal 27(3): 39-65. 
Levi M, Olson D, Agnone J, Kelly D (2009) Union Democracy Reexamined. Politics and 
Society 37(2): 203-228. 
Martin A, Ross G (2000) European Integration and the Europeanization of Labour. In: Gordon 
M, Turner L (eds) Transnational Cooperation among Labour Unions, 121-149. Ithaca, New 
York: ILR Press. 
Michels, R (1911/1915). Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies 
of Modern Democracy1HZ<RUN+HDUVW¶V,QWHUQDWLRQDO/LEUDU\&R 
Moody, K (1997) Workers in a Lean World: Unions in the International Economy. New York: 
Verso. 
Nowak J, Gallas A (2014) Mass Strikes against Austerity in Western Europe ± A Strategic 
Assessment. Global Labour Journal 5(3): 306-321. 
Offe C, Wiesenthal H (1980) Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Social 
Class and Organisational Form. Political Power and Social Theory 1: 67-115. 
Pulignano, V (2007) Going National or European? Local Trade Union Politics within 
Transnational Business Contexts in Europe. In: K. Bronfenbrenner (ed.), Global Unions: 
Challenging Transnational Capital through Cross-Border Campaigns. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, pp. 137±54. 
Pulignano V, Telljohaan V, Da Costa I and Rehfeldt U (2013) Local Actors and Transnational 
Structures: Explaining Trends in Multinational Company-Level Negotiations in Europe. In: 
Fairbrother P, Lévesque C and Hennebert M-A (eds) Transnational Trade Unionism: Building 
Union Power. New York: Routledge, 141-160. 
Saundry R, Turnbull P (1996) Melee on the Mersey: Contracts, Competition and Labour 
Relations on the Docks. Industrial Relations Journal 27(4): 275-288.  
6HDZULJKW-DVRQDQG-RKQ*HUULQJ³&DVH6HOHFWLRQ7HFKQLTXHVLQ&DVH6WXG\5HVHDUFK
A Menu RI4XDOLWDWLYHDQG4XDQWLWDWLYH2SWLRQV´Political Research Quarterly 61(2): 294-308. 
Stan S, Helle I and Erne R (2015). European Collective Action in Times of Crisis. Transfer 21 
(2): 131-139.  
Stepan-Norris J, Zeitlin M (1995) Union Democracy, Radical Leadership, and the Hegemony of 
Capital. American Sociological Review 60(6): 829-850. 
² ,QVXUJHQF\5DGLFDOLVPDQG'HPRFUDF\LQ$PHULFD¶V,QGXVWULDO8QLRQVSocial Forces 
75(1): 1-32. 
Stevis D, Boswell T (2007) Globalization and Labour: Democratizing Global Governance. 
/DQKDP0$5RZPDQDQG/LWWOH¿HOG 
7XUQEXOO3'RFN6WULNHVDQGWKH'HPLVHRI'RFNHUV¶µ2FFXSDWLRQDO&XOWXUH¶The 
Sociological Review 40: 294-318.  
²(2006) The War on Europe's Waterfront - Repertoires of Power in the Port Transport 
Industry. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 44(2): 305-326. 
--(2010) From Social Conflict to Social Dialogue: Countermobilization on the European 
Waterfront. European Journal of Industrial Relations 16(4): 333-349. 
Turnbull P, Sapsford D (2001) Hitting the Bricks: An International Comparative Study of 
Conflict on the Waterfront. Industrial Relations 40(2): 231-257. 
Turnbull P, Wass V (1994) The Greatest Game No More ± Redundant Dockers and the Demise 
RIµ'RFN:RUN¶Work, Employment and Society 8(4): 487-506. 
Voss K, Sherman R (2000) Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Union Revitalisation in the 
American Labour Movement. American Journal of Sociology 106(2): 303-349. 
Voss K (2010) Democratic Dilemmas: Union Democracy and Union Renewal. Transfer 16(3): 
369-382. 
Waterman, P (2001) Trade Union Internationalism in the Age of Seattle. Antipode, 33 (3): 312-
336. 
-- (1998) Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms. London: Continuum. 
Webb S, Webb B (1920) The History of Trade Unionism, 1666-1920. Westminster: Printed by 
the authors for the Trade Unionists of the United Kingdom.  
Wills, J (1998) Taking on the CosmoCorps? Experiments in Transnational Labour 
Organisation. Economic Geography, 74 (2): 111-130. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1: International Trade Union Organisational Models 
 
International Dockworkers 
Council 
International Transport 
Workers Federation/ European 
Transport Workers Federation 
Organisational 
Form 
Rank-and-file democracy: 
governance by shop-floor activists 
with little mediation by the 
international organisation. 
Bureaucracy: pyramidal structure 
of governance by international 
body, with direction from national 
trade union officials and 
professional staff. 
Key Actors Rank-and-file union activists. Full-time officers of national 
unions; professional staff at the 
international level. 
Primary 
Contentious 
Repertoire 
Coordinated industrial action at the 
local port level in different 
countries. 
Lobbying of EU policy makers; 
symbolic actions at the local and 
national level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of Interviews 
 
COUNTRY PORTS UNIONS/ INTERNATIONAL 
AFFILIATIONS 
NUMBER OF 
INTERVIEWS 
BELGIUM Antwerp ACV-TRANSCOM (ETF and 
IDC); BTB (ETF) 
2; 2 
CYPRUS Limassol SEGDAMELIN ± PEO (IDC) 2 
DENMARK Aarhus; Aalborg; 
Copenhagen 
3F Dockers (ETF and individual 
branches in IDC)  
5 
ETF 
Headquarters 
Brussels ETF staff 2 
FRANCE Le Havre CGT-Dockers (IDC) 2 
GERMANY Hamburg ver.di (ETF) 1 
GREECE Piraeus Piraeus Dockers Union (IDC); 
OMYLE (ETF and IDC) 
1; 1 
ITALY Genoa CGIL (IDC) 3 
ITF 
Headquarters 
London ITF staff 2 
NETHERLANDS Rotterdam FNV (ETF) 2 
PORTUGAL Lisbon Sindicato dos Estivadores e da 
Actividade Logistica (IDC) 
3 
SPAIN Barcelona; Valencia; 
Tenerife; Algeciras 
La Coordinadora (IDC) 6 
SWEDEN Stockholm; 
Gothenburg; 
Helsingborg 
Svenska Hamnarbetarforbundet 
(IDC) 
6 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
Tilbury; Felixstowe; 
Southampton; 
Thamesport; 
Liverpool 
UNITE the Union (ETF and 
individual branches in IDC) 
6 
 
 
